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SYMPOSIUM

INTRODUCTION
PeterNash Swisher*

On January 7, 1998, during the Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools in San Francisco, the AALS Insurance Law Section
presented a program entitled "The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations after Three Decades." The following articleg appearing in this
law review symposium are the culmination of those program presentations. I
would like to thank all the participants once again for their valuable
contributions, both to our AALS Program, and to this Symposium issue. I also
wish to thank Mr. Michael Ungaro and Ms. Susan Chmieleski and their
editorial staff at the ConnecticutInsuranceLaw Journalfor their invaluable
assistance in making this symposium on the insurance law doctrine of
reasonable expectations a reality.
One of our program speakers in San Francisco, Professor Robert Jerry,
discussed the current jurisprudential clash between a classical Formalist
approach to insurance contract interpretation in conflict with the modem
Functionalist insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations of the insured
to coverage. Professor Jerry declared that today there is "a battle for the heart
and soul--not only of contract law, or insurance law-but of American
jurisprudence generally."
Although Professor Ken Abraham, in his symposium article, disagrees
with this assessment, I do not believe that Professor Jerry has overstated this
crucial observation. Today, as in the past,' there still exists a fundamental clash
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School. Chair, AALS Insurance Law
Section (1997-1998) and Symposium Coordinator.
1. See, e.g., William Vance, The History ofthe Development of the Warrantyin Insurance
Law, 20 YALEL. J. 523, 534 (1911):

Policies became overgrown with a wilderness of warranties, many of the
most trivial character, in which the rights of the policyholder, however
honest and careful, were in grave danger of being lost.... The unseemly
struggle that ensued between the unwise insurers who sought to frame their
policies as to compel the courts to allow them the dishonest benefit of
forfeitures unsuspected by the insured, and the courts who sought by
liberal construction, and sometimes distortion of the language of the
policies, to do justice in spite of the warranties, resulted in a mass of
litigation and confused precedent, the like of which cannot be found in any
other field of our law.

HeinOnline -- 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1 1998-1999

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:1

between two competing theories of American jurisprudenc--Legal Formalism
and Legal Functionalism in an insurance law context. Other commentators, in
addition to Professor Jerry, also have observed the surprising resurgence of
Legal Formalism2 in American jurisprudence generally3 and in American
insurance law in particular.' In an insurance law context, Legal Formalism is
Id. at 534.
2. Legal Formalism, also known as Legal Positivism, is the traditional view that correct
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing judicial and legislative precedent, and the law
is viewed as a complete, autonomous system of logical, socially neutral, principles and rules.
Judging under this formalistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity rather than a matter
of choice.
See generally MARIO JoRI, LEGAL POSITIVISM (1992). See also Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how Legal Formalism still serves a legitimate
function in limiting judicial discretion or judicial activisim); and Ernest Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Imminent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (questioning
whether the law is essentially rational as the Formalists believe, or is essentially political, as the
Functionalists believe).
Legal Functionalism, also known as Legal Realism or Legal Pragmatism, on the other
hand, is based on the belief that the Formalist theory of a logical and socially neutral legal
framework is rarely attainable and may be undesireable in a changing society, and the
paramount concern of the law should not be logically consistency, but socially desirable
consequences. Thus, where Legal Formalism is more logically-based and precedent-oriented,
Legal Functionalism is more sociologically-based and result-oriented. See generally ROSCOE
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); WILIFRED E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968);
ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
3.

See, e.g., GARY AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN

JURISPRUDENCE (1990):

Not since the late 1920s and 1930s has there been such widespread interest in
American jurisprudence. But it is no longer the [Functionalists] who are challenging
established norms. The victories at the polls of political conservatives like Richard
Nixon and Ronald Reagan [and George Bush] [and the Republican Congress] and
the corresponding ideological commitments of many recent appointments to the
bench, now threaten the continued prominence of a theory ofjudicial interpretation
first articulated and advanced by the [Formalists]. Impossible only a decade ago,
"mechanical jurisprudence" has made a remarkable comeback, and a new Legal
Formalism may yet triumph as the principal mode of [judicial] interpretation of the
federal courts.
Id. at x.
4. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, JudicialRationales in InsuranceLaw: Dusting Offthe
Formalforthe Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991):
Legal Formalism today is far from a dead issue, at least in an insurance law
context, and may in fact be in a resurgence, while Legal Functionalism, as
exemplified by the insurance law doctrine of "reasonable expectations",
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exemplified through the seminal writings and the major influence of Professor
Samuel Williston.' A bedrock principle underlying Professor Williston's
classical Formalistic view of insurance contract interpretation is that an
insurance policy must be construed and enforced according to general
principles of contract law,6 and the courts therefore are not at liberty to
reinterpret or modify the terms of a clearly written and unambiguous insurance
policy.' A number of courts today continue to follow Professor Williston's
often-cited legal axioms regarding a contractually based interpretation of
insurance contracts. I
may be experiencing a more limited judicial application than various
commentators had initially predicted.
Id. at 1074. See also Bill Blum, The CaliforniaSupreme Court: Toward a RadicalMiddle, 77
A.B.A. J. 48 (Jan. 1991):
[T]be court has also expressed a preference for deferring policy judgments
affecting important social issues and commercial relationships to
legislative decision making. Some court watchers see this as a healthy
return to the proper role of the court as an interpreter, rather than a maker
think the court is too deferential .. "Inthe area of the
of law. Others ....
common law," says former Justice Grodin, "I think [the Lucas court's]
conservatism is reflected in the notion that it is unwise to expand liability,
that liability on the whole should be contracted, that contract principles
should be applied strictly and without regard, or with very little regard, for
differences in bargaining power between the parties, and in a tendency
toward the insistence upon clear, bright lines and rules."
Id. at 50.
Justice H. Walter Croskey's Symposium article infra examines this significant change in
California insurance law which, since 1990, now places significant limitations on the prior proinsured California doctrine of reasonable expectations to coverage.
5. See, e.g. WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1998 Cum. Supp.).
This treatise on contract law comprises 18 substantive volumes and three volumes of forms.
Professor Williston also was the Reporter for the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1928).
6. See 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900 at 28 (Walter H.E. Jeager ed., 3d ed. 1998
Cum. Supp.) ("[u]nless contrary to statute or public policy, a contract of insurance will be
enforced according to its terms"). Id.
7. See 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 610 at 512 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1998
Cum. Supp.). See also BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES 3-5 (7th ed. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Conn. 1990) ("[A]n
insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of
any written contract and enforced in accordance with the real intent of the parties as expressed
in the language employed in the policy.") See also American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. National
Ins. Ass'n, 577 N.E.2d 969, 971 (holding that coverage cannot be extended "beyond that
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Although this classical Formalistic contractual approach to the judicial
interpretation of insurance policies arguably brings greater uniformity and
predictability to insurance contract disputes, a serious problem with this
Formalistic interpretive approach is that insurance policies very often are not
ordinary contracts negotiated by parties with roughly equal bargaining power.
Rather, insurance policies very often constitute adhesion contracts, where the
insurer has a superior bargaining position, and the insured often must accept
the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis if the insured desires any kind of
insurance coverage at all.' Moreover, in the real world, few insureds take the
time or the effort to read and understand their insurance policies, although
under a Formalistic contractual interpretative approach they are generally
bound by the terms of their insurance contracts, despite any reasonable
policyholder expectation of coverage to the contrary.'0 Indeed, if an insurance
policy is sold as a "product" by appealing to an insured's "peace of mind," it
is still generally construed and interpreted as a "contract," at least by the
insurer, when loss occurs."
In reaction to this rather strict Formalistic contractual analysis of insurance
policies, a number of courts and commentators, beginning in the early 1970s,
and largely influenced by the writings of Professor (now Judge) Robert

provided in the contract and we may not rewrite the plain and unambiguous language of an
insurance contract") (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Hybrid Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597
N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ohio 1992) ("Thus, in reviewing an insurance policy, words and phrases
used therein 'must be given their natural and commonly accepted meaning, where they in fact
possess such meaning, to the end that a reasonable interpretation of the insurance contract
consistent with the apparent object and plain intent of the parties may be determined."') •
9. See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretationand Construction of Contracts,64
COLUM. L. REv. 833, 856 (1964). See also Todd Rakoff, ContractsofAdhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Powers v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 398 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Mich.
1986) ("[t]he common wisdom is that very few insurance policy purchasers read all or even
substantially all of the purchased contract, and it is not guaranteeable that they would
understand it if they did"). Id. at 413. See also JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8843 at 231 (rev. ed. 1981) (stating that most insureds never
read their policies, and 90% of those who do read their insurance policies would not understand
them).
11. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Constructingthe InsuranceRelationship:Sales Stories, Claims
Stories,and InsuranceContractDamages, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1395, 1417 (1994) (observing that
the insurance-as-contract approach is typically the baseline for judging an insurance
relationship, and "[m]any, if not most courts-whether deciding in favor of insurance
companies or insureds--rely heavily on a straightforward interpretation of the insurance
company's printed form").
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Keeton 2 and others," have applied a result-oriented Functionalistic approach
to the interpretation of insurance policy disputes in order to protect the
reasonable expectations of the insured policyholder to coverage, and from a
possible forfeiture of coverage that might occur under a more traditional
Formalistic insurance contract analysis. As propounded by Professor Keeton,
this Functionalistic insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations is based
upon a two-prong rationale: (1) that an insurer should be denied any
unconscionable advantage in an insurance contract; and (2) that the reasonable
expectations of insurance applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance coverage should be honored, even though a painstaking
study of the policy provisions contractually would have negated those
expectations. 4 A minority of state courts today have adopted this insurance
law doctrine of reasonable expectations at variance with the insurance policy
language.' 5
A major problem with this Functionalistic reasonable expectations
approach regarding the interpretation of insurance coverage disputes generally,
however, is that under the Keeton reasonable expectations formula, the
insurance policy need not be interpreted according to its clear and
unambiguous contractual language--which is anathema to a Formalistic theory
of insurance contract interpretation. 6 Moreover, those courts purportedly
12. See Robert E. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,83
HARv. L. REV. 961 (1970); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions:Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance:
Honoring the Reasonable Expectationsof the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); William
A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a PrincipledApplication, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267
(1986); Mark Rahdert, ReasonableExpectations Reconsidered, 18 CoNN. L. REV. 323 (1986);
Roger Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990).
14. See Keeton, supra note 12, at 963-964.
15. See, e.g., Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1976); Zuckerman
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441 (Ariz. 1982); and C & J Fertilizer Inc. v. Allied Mut.
Ins. Co. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). According to Professor Henderson, the following states
arguably have adopted the Keeton "reasonable expectations" doctrine: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. See
Henderson, supranote 13, at 828. Another six states may, or may not, have adopted the Keeton
"reasonable expectations" doctrine, but "the decisions from these six jurisdictions are not
entirely free from ambiguity themselves and require [further] analysis": Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Id. at 829-834.
16. See, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 13, at 335:
The Keeton formula suggests that an insured can have reasonable
expectations of coverage that arise from some source otherthan the policy
language itself, and that such an extrinsic expectation can be powerful
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applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations in interpreting insurance
coverage disputes have been unable to agree on what specific factors would
constitute such a reasonable expectation of coverage, and what factors would
not. 7 Accordingly, a number of other commentators have been critical of the
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations,18 and a number of other
enough to override any policy provisions no matter how clear. So
interpreted, the Keeton formula pushes insurance law in a dramatic new
direction, one that discards the traditional contract premise that a written
agreement is the controlling code for determining the parties' rights and
duties.
Id.
See also 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 6.03, at 376 (3d ed.
1995):
The reasonable expectations rule, therefore, abandons the general contract
principle that the insured's legitimate expectations are necessarily governed
and limited by the terms of the policy. That principle will, instead, be
applied only when it is fair to do so. As a result, in a proper case, an
insured may be held to be entitled to coverage despite unambiguous
language in the policy to the contrary.
Id.
17. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 13, at 1153 [footnotes omitted]:
The [Functionalist] courts have employed the [reasonable] expectations
principle in cases where the insured's expectation of coverage was
probably real and reasonable. They have also employed it where an
expectation of coverage was less probable, but the policy's denial of
coverage seemed unfair. Finally, they have relied on the principle even
where an expectation of coverage was improbable and the denial of
coverage would not appear unfair. In short, the judicial concept of an
"expectation" of coverage is not a monolithic one.
Id.
See also Rahdert, supra note 13, at 335:
mhe Keeton formula gives no hint at what factors other than the policy
provisions courts might use to define the "terms" of the insurance
arrangement, or how the courts are to measure the force of these external
factors against the force of restrictive policy provisions to determine which
should prevail in any given instance.
Id.
18. See, e.g., Conrad Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 6 FORUM 252 (1971); Frank Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution
Completed or Revolution Begun? 669 INS. L.J. 573 (1978); William Lashner, A Common Law
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courts have expressly rejected the insurance law doctrine of reasonable
expectations. 9 For example, the Florida Supreme Court on January 29, 1998,
in the case of Deni Associates of FloridaInc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co. declared:
We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
There is no need for it if the policy provisions are ambiguous
because in Florida ambiguities are construed against the
insurer. To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous provision
would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the
premiums are charged. See Sterling Merchandise Co. v.
HartfordIns. Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 131, 506 N.E.2d 1192,
1197 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) ("The reasonable expectation
doctrine requires a court to rewrite an insurance contract
which does not meet popular expectations. Such rewriting is
done regardless of the bargain entered into by the parties to
the contract.") ....
Construing insurance policies upon a determination as to
whether the insured's subjective expectations are reasonable
can only lead to uncertainty and unnecessary litigation. As
noted in Allen v. PrudentialProperty& CasualtyInsurance
Co., 839 P.2d 798, 803 (Utah 1992):
Today, after more than twenty years of attention to
the doctrine in various forms by different courts,
there is still great uncertainty as to the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine, its scope, and the
details of its application.2"

Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts,57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1175 (1982); and Stephen Ware, A Critiqueof the Reasonable
ExpectationsDoctrine, 56 U. Ci. L. REv. 1461 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 701 P.2d 217 (Idaho 1985); Menke v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.E.2d 539 (11.1980); and Bond Brothers v. Robinson, 471 N.E.2d
1332 (Mass. 1984). According to Professor Henderson, nine state courts have expressly
declared that the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine has not been adopted in their
respective jurisdictions: Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Washington and Wyoming. Henderson, supra note 13, at 834 n.68.
20. 711 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998).
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A majority of American courts today, however, have neither expressly
adopted nor expressly rejected the doctrine of reasonable expectations, 2 and
a number of these courts arguably apply a "middle ground" interpretive
approach to insurance coverage disputes-somewhere between a classical
Formalistic contractual approach on one hand, and the doctrine of reasonable
expectations on the other hand. 22 Thus, as Professor Roger Henderson aptly
observes, "[serious] questions remain as to whether the [reasonable
expectations] principle has developed into a full-fledged doctrine which can be
applied in a predictable and evenhanded manner by the courts."23
This Symposium addresses a number of these serious questions and issues
involving the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations after three
decades. We are fortunate to have ten excellent symposium articles analyzing
the doctrine of reasonable expectations from various perspectives, written by
seven academic lawyers, two prominent insurance law practitioners, and an
eminent jurist.
Professor Robert Jerry H is the Missouri Endowed Floyd R. Gibson
Professor of Law at the University of Missouri-Columbia Law School. He is

21. See, e.g., Collins v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1162 ([t]his court has not
explicitly adopted the doctrine of 'reasonable expectations,' at least by name, in any of its
forms. Neither has this court explicitly rejected it... At some point, this court will have to
address this series of conflicting precedents in our cases which today's majority opinion simply
ignores.") Id. at 1162 (Unis, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated"PolicyholderDefense
in InsuranceCoverage Litigation,42 DRAKE L. REv. 807, 827-29 (1993):
[A] third of the states appear receptive to the underlying notion of
vindicating the reasonable expectations of the policyholder but stop short
of treating the notion as a distinct doctrine or principle for decision.
Instead, these courts introduce reasonable expectations thinking into their
opinions, often combining it with the ambiguity doctrine and relatively
broad notions of promissory and equitable estoppel, waiver,
unconscionability, and public policy review, but stop short of using the
policyholders' expectations, however reasonable, to override policy
language viewed as clear.
See also Peter Nash Swisher, JudicialInterpretationsof Insurance ContractDisputes:
Toward a Realistic Middle GroundApproach, 57 OHiO ST. L.J. 543 (1996) (arguing that this
"middle ground" interpretive approach constitutes a realistic and viable reconciliation of Legal
Formalism and Legal Functionalism in an insurance law context).
23. Roger Henderson, supra note 13, at 824. See also Stempel, supra note 22, at 827-28
(where Professor Stempel argues that trying to characterize the various states' use of the
reasonable expectations doctrine is to a great extent an exercise in futility).
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also the author of a prominent insurance law treatise.24 Professor Jerry's
Symposium article presents an excellent overview and introduction to the
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations. The doctrine's roots,
Professor Jerry contends, are in the law of contract, but the influential analysis
of Judge Keeton in his. 1970 article in the Harvard Law Review gave this
doctrine very different dimensions. Even so, this "new" doctrine of reasonable
policyholder expectations had anchors in other legal principles with which
courts and lawyers were (and are) well familiar, even if this "new" doctrine, as
applied by the courts, gave these familiar legal principles a wider sweep.
Professor Jerry's overview thus sets the stage for a closer look at the insurance
law doctrine of reasonable expectations' contours by the other contributors to
this Symposium.
Professor Kenneth Abraham is the Class of 1962 Professor of Law at the
University of Virginia Law School, and author of a definitive article on the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. 5 In his present Symposium article,
Professor Abraham observes that the present-day doctrine of reasonable
expectations has had very little impact on the rise of managed health care
insurance, on Commercial General Liability insurance coverage disputes, in
determining automobile insurance rates, and in bad faith claims litigation over
the past twenty years. Today, Professor Abraham states that the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is infrequently invoked, and that it is rarely utilized in
most commercial disputes. Nevertheless, this "fairly minor" legal doctrine still
has fundamental importance in bringing a sense of equity and fairness to both
the insured and the insurer alike.
In contrast to a number of Symposium contributors who believe that the
interpretive split among the jurisdictions is part of a struggle for "the heart and
soul of insurance law," Professor Abraham asserts that this difference reflects
the normal and longstanding tension within insurance law between the
insurer's need for predictability of obligation, and the policyholders'
comparative lack of information about the scope of coverage that they have
actually purchased. This healthy tension, according to Professor Abraham, has
been incompletely resolved--and in all probability will always be incompletely
resolved-in the law of both the minority of jurisdictions that honor the
reasonable expectations of the insured, and in the majority of jurisdictions that
do not.

24. See ROBERT JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1996).

25. See Kenneth Abraham, Judge-Made Law andJudge-Made Insurance:Honoringthe
Reasonable Expectationsofthe Insured,67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981).
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Professor Roger Henderson is the Joseph Livermore Professor of Law
at the University of Arizona College of Law. Professor Henderson wrote an
earlier article assessing the doctrine of reasonable expectations after two
decades,26 and in his Symposium article, he analyzes the formation of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations in relation to the influence of forces outside
insurance law. Professor Henderson notes that almost three decades have
elapsed since the doctrine of reasonable expectations was first recognized, but
the doctrine has not swept the country. In fact, less than one-fourth of the
states have clearly adopted the doctrine as a substantive rule of insurance law
that permits courts to ignore unambiguous terms in insurance policy forms that
would otherwise defeat the expectations of the insured. Part of the reason for
this failure to thrive, Professor Henderson believes, may stem from the
confusion that still exists regarding the nature of the doctrine. This confusion
is perpetrated by courts that purport to adopt the doctrine, but who continue to
speak of it in a manner that fails to distinguish it from the canon of
construction contraproferentem, or doctrine of ambiguities. Whereas the latter
operates to resolve competing constructions of insurance policy terms, it should
be clear by now that the doctrine of reasonable expectations may operate
without regard to the existence of any ambiguities. On the other hand, the
doctrine of reasonable expectations may also suffer from the fact that many
courts have never come to grips with these competing formulations that were
articulated at the outset.
Professor Henderson notes that Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton
offered a formulation in his landmark Harvard Law Review articles that differs
materially from that rendered by the American Law Institute in revising the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS. Despite these differences, the courts have
spoken of the two formulations as if they were the same. This has created
questions about the substantive nature of the doctrine and its limits, questions
that would not work in favor of its recognition by more jurisdictions. This
situation, however, may be on the verge of change-a change that may be
dictated by forces outside the law of insurance.
The American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are currently revising Articles 2 and
2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, and are drafting a new article-Article
2B--dealing with licenses. In the process, they are considering the competing
formulations advanced by Judge Keeton and the ALI regarding the
enforceability of standard form contracts. They have found that there are
strong business and consumer forces that have entrenched views regarding the
26. See Roger Henderson, The Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations in InsuranceLaw
After Two Decades, 51 OWIo ST. L.J. 823 (1990).
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doctrine of reasonable expectations. Although no acceptable compromise
between these competing views has yet been crafted, there undoubtedly will be
some subsequent accommodation. Whatever the result, the doctrine of
reasonable expectations as it emerges from this process will very likely be
restated as the law in general when it comes time to draft a third Restatement
of Contracts, and since courts have uniformly cited the Restatement of
Contracts in support of a decision to adopt the doctrine of reasonable
expectations in insurance cases, Professor Henderson believes that the work of
the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws on the Uniform Commercial Code may well have a
significant impact on the doctrinal developments in insurance law in the future.
Professor Mark Rahdert is the I. Herman Stem Professor of Law at
Temple University Law School. Professor Rahdert believes that the reasonable
expectations doctrine, which enables courts to consider the reasonable
expectations of the insured as an aid to policy interpretation and as a guide for
guaranteeing the insured rights that the policy language may not itself provide,
has steadily gathered force, and has become the key principle of policy
interpretation in a number of major jurisdictions. At the same time, the doctrine
of reasonable expectations has sparked a great deal of controversy over the
extent to which this doctrine should be carried. This controversy has prevented
many courts from the wholesale embrace of the doctrine. In 1986 Professor
Rahdert wrote an article entitled ReasonableExpectationsReconsidered.2" In
that article, he detected opposition to the "strong" form of the reasonable
expectations doctrine, though he argued for its continued application where
restrictions on coverage amounted to "naked preferences" favoring the insurer.
He also offered suggestions for making the reasonable expectations doctrine
clearer, more consistent, and perhaps more defensible. A dozen years later,
however, the same uncertainties that plagued the doctrine of reasonable
expectations then, still linger today.
Professor Rahdert's Symposium article discusses "two relatively small but
significant points." Initially, he argues that part of the difficulty with the
doctrine of reasonable expectations is that it means too many different things
to different people. The doctrine can be invoked in at least four different ways,
and courts that utilize the doctrine in these different ways rarely distinguish
clearly among them. Usually, courts rely on the reasonable expectations of the
insured (1) simply as an interpretive device for ascertaining the meaning of the
policy language. This interpretive technique fits within traditional precepts of
27. Mark C. Rahdert, ReasonableExpectations Reconsidered, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 323
(1986).
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insurance law and should not be controversial. With reasonable frequency,
courts also employ reasonable expectations (2) to adjust contract terms that,
when applied to the insured's situation, would otherwise seem unconscionable.
While this idea might have been more controversial thirty years ago, it is
now a relatively widely accepted power of the courts. Moreover, what makes
the insured's expectation "reasonable" in this context is that it rests on a
plausible interpretation of the policy language, making this use of the
reasonable expectations doctrine a small leap from traditional practice. Insurers
can also modify policy language to adjust to these judicial determinations. On
rare occasions, courts also employ the reasonable expectations doctrine (3) to
avoid enforcing policy language that, even when clear, defeats the essential
objectives of the insurance policy. These instances involve a greater leap from
traditional insurance contract interpretation, but it is one that the courts seldom
take. Finally, in but a handful of instances, courts have invoked reasonable
expectations (4) to avoid policy limitations that would defeat public policies
regarding assured compensation. Only the more aggressive uses of (3) and (4)
ought to stir much controversy. Moreover, given the infrequency with which
these aggressive uses of the reasonable expectations doctrine occur, Professor
Rahdert believes, they amount to a tempest in a teapot.
Yet, from another perspective, the controversy surrounding the reasonable
expectations doctrine is well-deserved, because an aggressive use of the
doctrine challenges time-honored contract law assumptions that undergird the
basic structure on which insurance law depends-particularly the notion of the
policy as a fixed bargain. Since courts are basically unwilling to overhaul
insurance law in its entirety, or rethink its basic assumptions, it is difficult to
reconcile these aggressive applications of the reasonable expectations idea with
the other insurance law principles that routinely guide their decisions. The
result is instability about the role of reasonable expectations in insurance law
analysis.
Professor James Fischer is a Professor of Law at Southwestern
University School of Law, and he is the author of a seminal article on the
construction and interpretation of insurance contracts.28 The focus of Professor
Fischer's Symposium article is on what he perceives to be the failure of the
proponents of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to align the doctrine with
the larger goals that we believe insurance law should advance. In this context,
Professor Fischer looks at the doctrine of reasonable expectations in terms of
how it relates to policyholder and carrier conduct. For example, does the
28. See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation:Text Versus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 995 (1992).
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doctrine of reasonable expectations encourage policyholders to read or seek
assistance to understand the policy they purchase? Is this conduct that
insurance law should encourage? With respect to insurance carriers, does the
doctrine of reasonable expectations encourage carriers to write clearer, more
reasonable policies? Professor Fischer argues that in each case the answer is
"no." As presently formulated and applied, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations "accomplishes little more than to apply a label to a result already
reached, and sugarcoat that result with the patina of doctrinal respectability."
The doctrine of reasonable expectations' emphasis on "policyholder"
expectations also misdirects analysis away from what Professor Fischer
contends should be a public policy orientation toward the construction of
insurance contracts generally.
Professor Jeffrey Stempel is the Fonvielle & Hickle Professor of Law
and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the Florida State University
College of Law. He is also the author of a leading treatise on the interpretation
of insurance contracts.29 The thesis of Professor Stempel's Symposium article
is that the doctrine of reasonable expectations, although long a tacit pull on
insurance coverage jurisprudence, has never really been fully utilized as an
analytical tool and has not been fully deployed in a self-consciously thoughtful
and comprehensive manner. In part, this unfortunate underuse of the
reasonable expectations thinking resulted from the manner in which the
doctrine burst on the scene, with emphasis on the reasonable expectations
concept as something creating rights "at variance" with the language of the
insurance policy. Although the reasonable expectations approach does this in
a relatively small segment of the case law, it has far more potential impact as
a tool for addressing uncertain policy language and application, a potential that
has largely been overlooked due to an overfixation on the role of reasonable
expectations in overcoming clearly worded insurance policy language.
Viewed comprehensively, Professor Stempel argues that the reasonable
expectations of the parties to an insurance contract can be used not only to
construe ambiguous policy text or to overcome clear text violative of the
insured's reasonable expectations, but also to serve as a check on absurd
hyperliteral interpretations of policy text. In addition, the reasonable
expectations approach can assist courts in determining whether policy
provisions are ambiguous or whether "painstaking" study of the policy suggests
a clear meaning for problematic text. All of these varieties of the reasonable

29. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND
STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS (1994).
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expectations approach, Professor Stempel believes, merit fuller use by the
courts.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is viewed by the legal political
mainstream as too inconsistent with the prevailing American paradigm of
judicial restraint, strict construction of disputed texts, and minimal
governmental involvement in market activity. Properly seen, however, the
reasonable expectation doctrine, even in its strong "rights at variance with the
policy language" form, is actually consistent with the prevailing jurisprudential
ethos because of the context of insurance coverage. Determining the "correct"
meaning of an insurance policy inevitably requires not only a sharp focus on
policy text, but also full consideration of the reasonable expectations of both
insurer and insured, even where those expectations to some extent run counter
to the policy text, and certainly where the policy text is unclear, insufficiently
certain, or applied to unanticipated situations. Contrary to the assertions of
some courts and commentators, Professor Stempel argues that a strong judicial
invocation of the reasonable expectations doctrine poses no threat to separation
of powers and little serious obstacle toward vindicating the intent of the parties
to the insurance contract as well as the purpose of the insuring agreement.
Professor Jeffrey Thomas is an Assistant Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City. In his Symposium article, Professor
Thomas takes an interdisciplinary approach to the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. The traditional rules of insurance policy interpretation, he
argues, have developed within a "rational bargaining" paradigm. The
reasonable expectations doctrine, which permits courts to ignore express policy
language, is perhaps the most notable exception to the traditional rules of
insurance contract interpretation. Although the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, which is . intended to provide greater protection for
unsophisticated insurance consumers, is nontraditional, it is nevertheless an
extension of the "rational bargaining" paradigm. Professor Thomas uses
information available from other academic disciplines to show that the
"rational bargaining" paradigm and the reasonable expectations doctrine do not
accurately reflect insurance consumer behavior.
Eugene Anderson, Esquire is a partner in the New York City law firm of
Anderson, Kill & Olick P.C. with offices in Washington D.C., Philadelphia,
Newark, San Francisco, Phoenix, and Tucson. The author of numerous articles
on insurance law, as well as a recent two-volume treatise on insurance
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coverage litigation,3" Mr. Anderson has been called "the dean of insurance
policyholder attorneys" by Business Week magazine.
Mr. Anderson's thesis in his Symposium article asserts that an insurance
policy is a consumer product, not merely a contract. After years of premium
payments, and after a claim is made, policyholders all too often are shocked to
discover that the insurance coverage they thought they had purchased was
illusory. Unfortunately, an insurance product is much different from other
products. An insurance policy cannot be replaced after a policyholder suffers
a loss; it cannot be replaced after an insurance company breaches its obligation
to cover such a loss. A policyholder cannot decide to take its business
elsewhere once it has suffered a loss-by then, it is too late.
Traditional contract law principles, Mr. Anderson argues, do not
adequately compensate a policyholder who has been wrongfully denied
insurance coverage, since Anglo-American legal doctrines too often reward a
party who breaches a contract. Opportunistic breaches of insurance contracts
are common, and they are overwhelmingly cost-effective for insurance
companies. Insurance companies win by saying "No." The reasonable
expectations doctrine thus gives policyholders the insurance coverage they
thought they had, and the courts should apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations more fully to protect a policyholder's rights as the purchaser of a
product, not a contract.
Susan Popik, Esquire is a partner in the San Francisco law firm of
Chapman, Popik & White. Ms. Popik is a prominent insurance defense
attorney, and she also serves on the editorial board of the CGL Reporter and
as a contributing editor for the CaliforniaCivil Litigation Reporter in the area
of insurance litigation."
The thesis of Ms. Popik's Symposium article is that in theory, and when
properly limited, the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations serves
a useful consumer protection function. In practice, however, the doctrineintended as a shield against contractual overreaching--has too often been used
as a sword to eviscerate clear and unambiguous policy language. In the hands
of a result-oriented court, invocation of the "reasonable expectations" mantra
becomes a license to rewrite the policy to ensure a result that benefits the
insured. In these instances, the question becomes not what the insured, at the
time of purchase, reasonably expected the policy to cover, but what he or she,
following a loss, fervently wished it covered.
30. See

EUGENE ANDERSON,

ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION

Rodriguez ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1997)
31. See CAL. Civ. LrNG. REP. (1985-Present).
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Although it would seem that one answer to this problem would be to limit
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to a rule of construction, thus requiring
a judicial finding of ambiguity before the doctrine could be invoked, the case
law does not support this conclusion. Ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder,
argues Ms. Popik, and result-oriented courts have had no greater difficulty
divining multiple meanings than they have conjuring disappointed
expectations.
Whether employed to defeat the terms of unambiguous policy language or
as a variation of the contraproferentum doctrine, Ms. Popik argues that the
reasonable expectations doctrine must be confined to those relatively few
situations in which there is objective evidence beyond the insured's personal
assurances to support the application of the doctrine. To accept any other rule
would be to countenance a form of post-loss underwriting that leads to
inconsistent and unpredictable results, which ultimately inures to the detriment
of insurers and insureds alike.
. The Honorable H. Walter Croskey is Associate Justice of the California
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. In addition to his busy judicial
workload, Justice Croskey also is a noted authority on California insurance
law.3" In his Symposium article, Justice Croskey discusses the development,
evolution, and the current status of the doctrine of reasonable expectations in
California insurance law from a judicial perspective.
Justice Croskey notes that in the context of the construction and
interpretation of insurance policy provisions, California insurance law has long
recognized the importance of an insured's reasonable expectations to coverage.
For example, in 1936, a California Court of Appeal decision noted that an
insurance policy's provisions "must be construed so as to give the insured the
protection which he reasonably had a right to expect, and to that end [any]
doubts, ambiguities, and uncertainties arising out of the language used in the
policy must be resolved in his favor." Prior to 1990, this summarized
California's very wide open pro-insuredapproach to the resolution of policy
ambiguity issues. The doctrine of reasonable expectations therefore was the
effective rationale justifying a bias in favor of coverage when any ambiguity
in the policy language semantically could be demonstrated.
However, in 1990 this all changed. In what can only be described as a
major departure from prior law, the California Supreme Court adopted a more
restrictive rule of construction with the emphasis now placed on the objectively
reasonable expectations of the insured. Now, in California, no ambiguity can
32. See, e.g., H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California:Its History, Development and
CurrentStatus, 26 TORT& INS. L.J. 561 (1991).

HeinOnline -- 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 16 1998-1999

1998]

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

be resolved in favor of the insured unless it comports with the insured's
objectively reasonable expectations in light of: (1) the language used in the
entire policy; (2) the total circumstances of the case; and (3) common sense.
Thus, the doctrine of reasonable expectations, which had served as the
rationale for a pro-insured interpretive approach in California, now serves as
an analytical tool in California for limiting coverage. Justice Croskey's
Symposium article examines this significant change, the full scope of which
was not initially appreciated by the bench and bar, and the court's rationale for
its adoption, and how it is being currently applied in particular cases. We are
honored to include Justice Croskey's article in our Symposium issue on the
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations after three decades.

The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and Related Insurance
Coverage Issues:
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MICH. L. REv. 541 (1996).
EUGENE ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION

2.15 (1997).

HeinOnline -- 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 17 1998-1999

§§ 2.1-

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:1

Gary Birnbaum, et al., StandardizedAgreements and the ParolEvidence
Rule: Defining andApplying the ExpectationsPrinciple,26 ARIZ. L. REV. 793
(1984).
Edward Collins, Insurance Contract Interpretation: The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations Has No Place in Illinois, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 687
(1985).
Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectationas Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 603
(1980).
Comment, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155 (1984).
Comment, ReasonableExpectations: The Insurer'sDilemma, 24 DRAKE
L. REV. 853 (1975).
Amy Cubbage, The Interaction of the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations and Ambiguity in Drafting: The Development of the Kentucky
Formulation,85 KY. L.J. 435 (1997).
Douglas Fadel, Utah Rejects the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine in
Insurance ContractInterpretation, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 275 (1993).
Laurie Kindel Fett, The Reasonable ExpectationsDoctrine:An Alternative
to Bending and Stretching TraditionalTools of ContractInterpretation, 18
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1113 (1992).
James Fischer, Why are Insurance ContractsSubject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992).
Frank Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Completed or
Revolution Begun?, 669 INS. L.J. 573 (1978).
David Goodhue, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in
Massachusettsand New Hampshire:A ComparativeAnalysis, 17 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 891 (1991).

HeinOnline -- 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 18 1998-1999

1998]

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

Roger Henderson, The Doctrineof ReasonableExpectations in Insurance
Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990).
Kenneth J. Homer, Jr., Insurance-Contracts-TheAmbiguity in the
Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 423 (1986).
ROBERT JERRY 1, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW

§ 25D (2d ed.

1996).
Kelso, Idaho and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A
Springboardfor an Analysis of a New Approach to a Valuable But Often
MisunderstoodDoctrine,47 INS. COUNS. J. 325 (1980).
Fredrich Kessler, ContractsofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1971).
William Mark Lashner, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of
ReasonableExpectations, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982).
David Leitner, Enforcing the Customers "ReasonableExpectations" in
InterpretingInsurance Contracts,38 FED. INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 379.
William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled
Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267 (1986).
Note, Reasonable Expectations Approach to Insurance Contract
InterpretationModified in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 577 (1982).
BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE

COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.03 (9th ed. 1998).
Jeffrey Pawelski, Insurers Don'tNeed the Courts to "Babysit" Them: An
Argumentfor Reasonable Expectations in American Family Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Elliot, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 375 (1996).

Pitcher, Insured's "Reasonable Expectations" as to Coverage of an
InsurancePolicy, 20 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts § 59 (1970).
Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 6 FORUM 116 (1970).

HeinOnline -- 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 19 1998-1999

20

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:1

Mark Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV.
3223 (1986).
Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983).
Arnold Rotkin, StandardizedForms: Legal Documents in Search of An
AppropriateBody of Law, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (1977).
W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts andDemocraticControl of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
W. Wylie Spicer, Ch-Ch-Changes: Stumbling Toward the Reasonable
Expectationsof the Assured in MarineInsurance,66 TUL. L. REV. 457 (1991).
Conrad Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 6 FORUM 252 (1971).
Scot C. Stirling, ReasonableExpectations ofInsuranceCoverage and the
Problem of EnvironmentalLiabilities, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395 (1990).
JEFFREY STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1994).

Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in InsuranceLaw: Dusting Off
the Formalfor the Function,52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991).
Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract
Disputes: Toward a RealisticMiddle GroundApproach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543
(1996).
Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the ReasonableExpectationsDoctrine, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989).
ALLAN WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 6.03 (3d ed. 1995).

HeinOnline -- 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 20 1998-1999

